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ONLINE GAMES AND IP - BATTLE OF THE FORMS TO SOCIAL 
NORMS:  RECONCEPTUALISING AND RE-LAYERING? 
Kim Barker* 
Abstract 
Online interactive environments like World of Warcraft, Second Life, Habbo and The 
Sims Online are international entities, attracting users across the globe. They have one 
common regulatory mechanism; the End User License Agreement (EULA). This 
contractual document forms the cornerstone of the regulatory and governing system 
within each of these distinct spaces. Yet the EULA is regularly contravened by users 
and the game provider alike, suggesting it is neither fit for purpose, nor adequately 
designed for these online spaces. The EULA forms not only the contractual 
relationship between the service provider and the end-user, but is also intended to 
control the behaviour of the users in the relevant online environment. These are very 
often the only forms of control or regulation that are present in online environments, 
and therefore control more than user behaviour.  
Despite this, there is no specific set of ‘virtual laws’ in these online environments yet 
the disputes arising from these environments are becoming increasingly common. 
There are online / offline boundaries, and different levels of controlling mechanisms. 
These boundaries are only one dimension of the control required in these spaces. 
Code is protected by copyright, and copyright is allocated by contracts. As such, there 
is an inter-dependent core which sees code, copyright and contract allocating not just 
property rights and intellectual property rights but adjudicating on disputes. In this 
relationship, there are different levels which combine to produce a situation whereby 
contract is dominant. This paper will consider the current layers of control in online 
gaming environments in light of some examples of legal disputes that have arisen. It 
will consider the Magic Circle theory and the Theory of Interration – and potential 
modifications in light of Tseng’s suggestions but also in context of disputes and the 
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layers currently in place before suggesting that there is perhaps a chasm in this system 
of layered governance and control.  
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1. Introduction 
Virtual worlds and online games – particularly Massively Multiplayer Online Role 
Playing Games or MMORPGs1 – are traditionally defined by the characteristics that 
they share.2 This is indicative of the difficulties that arise in pinpointing precisely 
where this genre fits within the wider media landscape. There have historically been 
several attempts to pinpoint an agreed-upon definition of online games, but this has 
largely been unsuccessful.3 Bell for example highlights that Massively Multiplayer 
Online Games (MMOGs) 4  are persistent, continuous environments, which are 
operated by players and facilitated through networks. 5  These characteristics 
distinguish these games from other games such as Angry Birds6 or Lego Star Wars,7 
which whilst still games, are of a different genus, lacking the central massive and 
multiplayer elements. This is by no means the leading definition however, and others 
such as Kennedy have indicated that there are other elements which ought to be 
considered in defining these spaces, suggesting that the feature of avatars is also one 
which sets these games aside from other games.8  
Definitions and characteristics of these online spaces are of secondary importance; it 
is appropriate to highlight the factors that make them unique, but it is more significant 
to identify the spaces and environments which provide the contextual framework for 
the discussion to follow. Nevertheless, the definition of the spaces themselves is 
indicative of a wider difficulty that is a constant factor in dealing with these 
environments: precision.9 Precision is a prerequisite, as is a need to appreciate how 
online spaces differ from the offline world, and from other environments. To this 
extent, MMORPGs are a part of cyberspace – without a doubt, largely because their 
existence is dependent upon their ‘cyber’ element – but more importantly they are 
almost a segregated area of cyberspace. In governing, regulating or controlling 
                                                
1 Hereafter MMORPGs.  
2 R Kennedy, “Virtual Rights? Property in Online Game objects and Characters” (2008) 17 Information 
& Communication Technology Law 95-106; M Bell, “Toward a Definition of Virtual Worlds” (2008) 1 
Journal for Virtual Worlds Research; K Barker, “MMORPGing, Law and Lingo” in M Freeman and F 
Smith (eds), Current Legal Issues: Law and Language (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 417-433.  
3 See J Rogers, “A Passive Approach to Regulation of Virtual Worlds” (2008) 76 George Washington 
Law Review 405-425; F G Lastowka and D Hunter, “The Laws of the Virtual Worlds” (2004) 92 
California Law Review 1-73; B T Duranske, Virtual Law: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Virtual 
Worlds (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2008); R Kennedy, see note 2 above; M Bell, see note 2 above. 
4 Hereafter MMOGs.  
5 M Bell, see note 2 above. But see also: T L Taylor, Play Between Worlds: Exploring Online Game 
Culture (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2006), at 9–11; R Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds (San 
Francisco: New Riders, 2003), at 102–104; M de Zwart, “Contractual Communities: Effective 
Governance of Virtual Worlds” (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 605-628; G 
Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 
at 9. 
6 Angry Birds, available at http://www.angrybirds.com/ (accessed 20 May 2013).  
7 Lego Star Wars, available at http://starwars.lego.com/en-gb/Games/Default.aspx (accessed 20 May 
2013). 
8 R Kennedy, see note 2 above. 
9 K Barker, see note 2 above. 
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cyberspace – of which there are separate and lengthy debates elsewhere10 – the 
concept is one which is essential. If cyberspace is viewed as a one-dimensional space, 
almost parallel to the offline world, then it is difficult to appreciate how such a place 
is difficult to control. However, if cyberspace is viewed as a fragmented space – as 
Murray has suggested11 – then it is easier to conceptualise controlling at least parts of 
it, if not the entirety of it. It is, however, also easy to forget that cyberspace is 
multijurisdictional and transnational, and that national boundaries do not accord to the 
boundaries of cyberspace.12  
Defining what online games are is almost as important as identifying what they are 
not, as this assists in understanding how they operate, and how they are controlled.13 
Similarly, it is beneficial to appreciate the different terminology that is used to 
identify with such environments, and the typical behaviours which are 
commonplace.14 MMORPGs as outlined above, are largely defined by what they are, 
or the characteristics which identify them and distinguish them from others. Whilst 
there is little consensus about a precise definition, there is at least partial agreement 
that states online games are almost unique in terms of what they offer to their users or 
– to those interacting with Second Life – residents.15  
The late 1990s and early 2000s introduced issues which could produce legal 
disagreements in virtual online interactive environments.16 It is apt that some of these 
debates have again reared their heads in relation to social networking sites, 17 
indicating that the issues arising in the 1990s when there was a significant advent of 
new environments becoming available, are far from complete and are still relevant 
and current throughout the development of Web 2.0 and the advent of Web 3.0.18  
This paper will discuss some of the recent legal issues and legal disputes that have 
arisen in a number of online games and virtual environments, with an aim of 
identifying the weaknesses in the governance structure and regulation of them. The 
                                                
10 See A Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Abingdon: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2006); D G Post, “Governing Cyberspace: Law” (2007-8) 24 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech Law Journal 883-914; D G Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose – Notes on the 
State of Cyberspace (New York: OUP, 2009); J Goldsmith and T Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 
(New York: OUP, 2008); N Suzor, “Order Supported By Law: The Enforcement of Rules in Virtual 
Communities” (2012) 63 Mercer Law Review 523-595, at 530; N Suzor, “The Role of the Rule of Law 
in Virtual Communities” (2010) 25 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1817-1886, at 1818. 
11 A Murray, ‘Looking back at the Law of the Horse – Why Cyberlaw and the Rule of Law are 
important’ BILETA 2013 Keynote Speech available at http://theitlawyer.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/my-
keynote-address-to-bileta.html (accessed 20 May 2013).  
12 Internet & Jurisdiction, Synthesis II (December 2012) available at 
http://www.internetjurisdiction.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Internet-Jurisdiction-Synthesis-II-
December-2012.pdf (accessed 21 January 2013). 
13 See below at Controlling Online Gaming Environments.  
14 K Barker, see note 2 above. 
15 S Robbins and M Bell, Second Life for Dummies (Oxford: Wiley, 2008).  
16 See below at The Legal Issues Arising in Virtual Worlds and MMORPGs. 
17 See for example: S Anderson, “’Instagram Act’ could see social media users lose control of their 
photos” (The Telegraph, 30 April 2013) available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-
media/10028168/Instagram-Act-could-see-social-media-users-lose-ownership-of-their-own-
photos.html (accessed 1 June 2013).  
18 N Spivack, “Web 3.0: The Third Generation is Coming” (2007) available at 
http://lifeboat.com/ex/web.3.0 (accessed 20 May 2013).  
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focus of this paper will consider the layers of control which are present in online 
games and virtual worlds, and discuss in light of some recent disputes and issues, 
whether there is an omission in the current layers of control. The concept of layers of 
control is two-fold. In the first instance, it considers the layers of controlling 
mechanisms which are present in online games currently, and includes approaches 
such as contractual control, dispute resolution mechanisms and real-world legal 
disputes. The secondary element considers layers present in these environments, 
including contractual control, in-game reporting systems and software controls. These 
can be combined to produce a so-called ‘big picture’ of the governance paradigm in 
online games and virtual worlds. This paper will suggest that current approaches, both 
theoretical and practical have left a large gap whereby disputes occur, but which 
provide few realistic options for the resolution of disputes. 
This is a relevant debate, especially in the context of the enduring difficulties 
surrounding the contractual-copyright paradox and relationship that is much relied 
upon in the digital age, by both content creators and content consumers. This paper 
will also consider a potential shift in the perspectives of governance and control in 
these online interactive environments in light of the layers present.  
2. The Legal Issues arising in Virtual Worlds and MMORPGs  
The initial issues that attracted attention in online games and virtual worlds concerned 
the activities of users in LambdaMOO – an online world which pioneered the idea of 
self-governance and peer-rule.19 It was this environment that introduced the idea of 
virtual sexual assault and virtual rape20 and widened the debates surrounding cyber-
harm and cybercrimes.21 In the late 1990s as virtual worlds and online games were 
developing at a pace concurrent with technology, the activities’ and actions of users 
were also changing, and were perhaps beginning to challenge the status quo, 
particularly in terms of control and governance.  
The issues arising in LambdaMOO22 that led to news coverage and subsequent 
attention indicated that hitherto, the contractual- and community-dominated systems 
of control were adequate and at least appropriate for the environments. However, 
                                                
19 J Burgess et al, “The History of LambdaMOO” available at http://www-cs-
faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs181/projects/controlling-the-virtual-world/history/mud.html (accessed 
18 May 2013).  
20 R MacKinnon, “Virtual Rape” (1997) 2 Journal of Computer Mediated Communication available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2/issue4/mackinnon.html#References (accessed 20 January 2013).  See: J 
Dibbell and C Thorn (eds), VIOLATION: Rape in Gaming (CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform, 2012). 
21 See for example BBC News, “’Game theft’ led to fatal attack” (31 March 2005) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4397159.stm (accessed 8 August 2011), where a gamer lost his 
life over a virtual item obtained through gaming. See also: S Brenner, “Fantasy Crime: The Role of 
Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds” (2008) 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 
1-91, at 37; O S Kerr, “Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds” [2008] University of Chicago Law Forum 
415-429.  
22 J L Mnookin, “Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence of Law in LambdaMOO” (1996) 2 Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2/issue1/index.html  
(accessed 17 February 2013); R MacKinnon, see note 20 above. 
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following the dual punishment of Mr Bungle – the avatar at fault23 – and the 
community judgment,24 it became clear that the experimental and idealistic system of 
control was not working and was susceptible to manipulation or abuse. This was the 
situation with Mr Bungle, who had been judged by a group of his avatarian peers, and 
then when punished, was banished by the community leader in addition to the 
punishment outlined by the community. 25  This was not only a breach of the 
community rules, but was also a problem in terms of what the community thought 
appropriate. If the community were not prepared to follow the dispute resolution 
provisions, it was farcical to have such provisions outlined; this indicates that 
contractual agreements are not adhered to, respected or read.26 Where they are the 
mechanisms of control and they are not obeyed, this essentially leads to a lawless 
environment.27 In our offline worlds, we rely upon law and order to maintain social 
structure and ensure that justice is at least seen to be carried out. However, in online 
spaces, which are potentially akin to private territories,28 it is difficult to observe this 
situation. Rosedale has indicated such a position, advocating that Second Life is a 
country rather than a game.29 Such an interpretation has significant ramifications in 
terms of layers of governance if true. Consequently, it is difficult to assert that the 
‘tried and tested’ systems of governance and regulation have been successful.  
However, this was not the only evidence of issues arising in online games and virtual 
environments which challenged the accepted system of governance and control. In 
2003, Second Life proclaimed that they allowed their residents property rights in their 
virtual property.30 In 2007 this became an issue of debate and legal dispute between 
Marc Bragg and the developers of Second Life (Linden Research), with Bragg 
claiming a contractual entitlement to claim property and intellectual property rights.31 
Whilst this dispute was settled before the issue went to court, there was no 
adjudicated outcome, there was nevertheless an understanding that property rights 
when declared in a contractual agreement are enforceable.32 An alternative and 
additional element to this dispute concerned a cornerstone of the dispute resolution 
procedures contained within the contractual agreement users are required to accede 
                                                
23 R MacKinnon, see note 20 above.  
24 J Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World (London: Fourth Estate, 1998) 
available at http://www.juliandibbell.com/articles/a-rape-in-cyberspace/ (accessed 16 February 2013).  
25 J L Mnookin, see note 22 above.  
26 Y Bakos et al, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to 
Standard Form Contracts” (2009) NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-40, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256 (accessed 9 August 2013). 
27 See for example D G Post (2009), note 10 above. 
28 B T Duranske, see note 3 above, at 126, 127. 
29 Evans v Linden Research (2011) 763 F Supp 2d 735 (E.D. Penn) [30]. 
30 M Haughey, “Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations” (14 November 2003) available at 
http://creativecommons.org/press-releases/entry/3906 (accessed 20 May 2013).  
31 Bragg v Linden Research (2007) 487 F Supp 2d 593 (E.D. Penn). 
32 There is of course, a distinction between journalistic reports of rape in online worlds, and a federally 
lodged lawsuit concerning property rights, but they are both examples of a wider issue concerning the 
position of users and governance controls in online interactive environments such as Second Life and 
LambdaMOO.  
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to.33 Residents are thus required to proceed through the stipulated dispute resolution 
methods. This was an onerous obligation, one the US courts determined was 
unenforceable, and users could not therefore be required to follow this procedure.34 
The effect of this judgment has not been to outlaw contractual dispute resolution 
procedures, but to ensure that they are fair, and under US contract law, conscionable. 
The Bragg case35 has not been the only indicator of property disputes in Second Life 
or virtual worlds. There have been other disputes and disagreements that have seen 
residents and the developers enter court proceedings to reach a resolution. In the case 
of Volkov v Eros,36 again from 2007, the property concerned was that which had been 
developed by Volkov and allegedly infringed by Eros. The dispute proceedings 
concerned not only property but also intellectual property and business interests. 
Again the decision reached was not one that a court adjudicated on, and settlement 
was reached.37 These cases serve not only to indicate that there are issues with the 
dispute resolution provisions, but also that user-user disputes were likely to increase 
as a result. Volkov has since been followed by a number of class actions concerning 
property interests in the US38 usually against the game developer rather than by users 
against other users. This is perhaps a quirk specific to online interactive gaming 
environments which allow and even encourage users to introduce their own scripted 
items,39 and user-generated content into the environments. Lastowka and Humphreys 
have indicated that this is suggestive of a reflection of rights for the users,40 and a 
shifting sense of the role users play in online games.41 One element perhaps, in which 
the users expect to hold some form of property interest in the items and even the 
                                                
33 Second Life, “Terms of Service” (7 May 2013) available at http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php 
(accessed 20 May 2013).  
34 B Duranske, “Bragg v Linden Update: Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration 
Denied” (Virtually Blind, 1 June 2007) available at  http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/06/01/bragg-v-
linden-update-motions-to-dismiss-and-compel-arbitration-denied/ (accessed 20 January 2012).  
35 Bragg v Linden Research, see note 31 above.  
36 Eros LLC v John Doe, unreported, (2007) US District Court (Middle District, Florida) case no. 8:07-
cv-1158- T-24TGW. 
37  Digital Media Law Project, “Eros LLC v Doe” (10 September 2007) available at 
http://www.dmlp.org/threats/eros-llc-v-doe (accessed 18 May 2013).  
38 See for example Eros LLC v Thomas Simon, unreported, (2007) US District Court (Southern District, 
New York) case no. 1:07-cv-477; Evans v Linden Research 2012 WL 5877579 (US District Court, 
Northern District, California). 
39 Second Life, “Getting Started in LSL scripting in Second Life” available at 
http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Getting_started_with_LSL (accessed 20 June 2012). 
40 G Lastowka, “User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds” (2007-8) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law 893 895-917, at 899. See also: W J Nichols, “Painting Through 
Pixels: The Case for a Copyright in Videogame Play” (2006-2007) 30 Columbia Journal of Law and 
the Arts 101-132; T Scassa, “Acknowledging Copyright’s Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated 
Content and Canadian Copyright Law” in M Geist (ed), The Copyright Pentalogy (Ottawa: Ottawa 
University Press, 2012) 431-453.  
41 S Humphreys et al, “Fan based production for computer games: User led innovation, the ‘drift of 
value’ and the negotiation of intellectual property rights” (2005) 114 Media International Australia 16; 
S Humphreys and J Banks, “The labour of user co-creation. Emerging social network markets?” (2008) 
14 Convergence 401-418. 
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environment itself. It is after all, unrealistic to expect people to work for something 
that is not in their own interest.42  
Second Life is not the only multi-user environment which saw property disputes arise 
during 2007 and 2008. World of Warcraft – perhaps the most popular online game in 
history43 – was also the subject of legal disputes. These predominantly concerned 
property ownership, but they also concerned issues of breaching the EULA and 
contravening the Terms of Use Agreements.44 Perhaps the most significant arose 
between Hernandez and Internet Gaming Exchange (IGE Ltd).45 Both parties were 
users of World of Warcraft, and used the environment for different purposes; the first 
for casual use, and the latter for business use. Hernandez alleged that IGE was 
interfering with the gaming experience of non-commercial users by engaging in gold-
farming.46 This practice involves carrying out repeated menial tasks to generate 
achievements and currency which could then be sold to other users to save them from 
carrying out the same activity, and thereby allowing them to ‘level up’ and reach the 
more challenging levels quickly. This interfered with the enjoyment of the game for 
the other users, and Hernandez alleged that not only were IGE in breach of contract 
through breaching the EULA, and using the gaming platform for a commercial 
purpose, but that the Terms of Use Agreement was breached through engaging in such 
behaviour. A further allegation surrounded the role of Blizzard Entertainment. 
Hernandez and IGE have no contractual relationship; they contract individually with 
Blizzard.47 As a result, Hernandez lodged proceedings against a third party, and 
sought to involve the game developer in resolving the dispute. Interestingly, yet again 
a settlement was reached, through which IGE agreed not to engage in such activities. 
This was not only a victory for Hernandez, but was also significant for other users of 
online games and virtual worlds because a third-party action succeeded.48 This is 
significant because it indicates that third parties can succeed in actions, and will not 
hesitate to involve the platform providers in their disputes.  
During the late 2000s, the landscape concerned with legal disputes arising from online 
games and virtual worlds was largely dominated by issues of virtual property and 
intellectual property rights. However, this has now developed and broadened, so that 
disputes are more widespread and concern more than mere proprietary interests. In 
July 2012, it was reported that Habbo was wide open to abuse by sexual predators 
                                                
42 S J Horowitz, “Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property” (2006-2007) 20 Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology 443-458, at 444; B T Duranske, see note 3 above, at 140-1. 
43 P Tassi, “World of Warcraft Drops a Million Subscribers in Three Months” (Forbes, 8 March 2012) 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/08/03/world-of-warcraft-drops-a-million-
subscribers-in-three-months/ (accessed 18 May 2012).  
44 MDY Industries v Blizzard Entertainment 2010 WL 5141269 (9th Circuit). 
45 Hernandez v Internet Gaming Entertainment, unreported, (2007) US District Court (Southern 
District, Florida), case no. 07-CIV-21403-COHN/SELTZER. 
46 K Barker, see note 2 above, at 429. 
47 K Barker, “MMORPGing - The Legalities of Game Play” (2012) 3 European Journal for Law and 
Technology, available at http://ejlt.org//article/view/119 (accessed 9 August 2013).  
48 J Fairfield, “Third Party Beneficiaries and Other Fantastical Beasts in Virtual Worlds” (TerraNova, 
14 April 2009) available at http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2009/04/third-party-beneficiaries-
and-other-fantastical-beasts-in-virtual-worlds.html (accessed 16 February 2013). 
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seeking to abuse and molest children.49 This was quite obviously in breach of the 
acceptable use policy50 and the so-called control and protection measures that were in 
place in this environment. Unfortunately, the Habbo debacle highlighted the ease with 
which the license agreements and other contractual pre-requisites are circumvented 
and ignored by users who pay little attention to their provisions. Whilst such activity 
is doubtless in breach of the contractual agreements, it again demonstrates the 
weaknesses and flaws of the contractual system of regulation and control. Perhaps 
more alarmingly, it also highlights the culture that is dominant in online gaming, and 
this is further exemplified through Anita Saarkesian, in the summer of 2012,51 who 
became an object of hatred and ridicule for daring to speak out and investigate the 
sexism and anti-female perspectives adopted by a number of gamers.52 
Whilst these examples are sporadic and few in number, they serve to highlight and 
demonstrate the difficulties that have become prevalent in the recent past. There are a 
number of disputes that have not been considered here that concern other elements of 
online gaming and its intersection with the law.53 It is easy to forget that these spaces 
are entirely virtual, and are entirely controlled by those who create them. This is 
problematic for no reason other than the producers and developers of the games will 
have a vested interest in maintaining their subscriber base rather than disciplining 
their users and paying customers. This is another flaw in the contractual system of 
control, and highlights that whilst there are layers of control, for example, contractual 
acceptable use policies, and dispute resolution systems, there are few standardised 
layers across environments, and it is difficult to determine any scale of gradual 
layering designed to resolve disputes at different levels. The current approach to 
controlling online games adopts a number of different approaches, and therefore a 
number of different levels of control.  
3. Controlling online gaming environments 
There are a number of approaches which have been mooted in relation to online 
games and virtual worlds as potential governing structures and theories of control.54 
                                                
49 R Seifert, “Striptease and cyber sex: My stay at Habbo Hotel” (Channel 4 News, 12 June 2012) 
available at http://www.channel4.com/news/striptease-and-cyber-sex-my-stay-at-habbo-hotel (accessed 
16 February 2013).  
50 Habbo, “The Habbo Way” available at http://www.habbo.com/safety/habbo_way (accessed 16 
February 2013).  
51 K Fernandez-Blance, “Misogyny, Violence highlighted in online video game, social media threats” 
(11 July 2012) available at http://www.londoncommunitynews.com/2012/07/misogyny-violence-
highlighted-in-online-video-game-social-media-threats/ (accessed 20 July 2012). 
52  A Saarkesian, “Tropes v Women in Video Games” available at 
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/566429325/tropes-vs-women-in-video-games (accessed 16 
February 2013).  
53 For example, virtual thefts and other crime related elements of virtual interaction.  
54 For example, The Magic Circle, Theory of Interration, Passive Regulation. See also: B Glushko, 
“Tales of the (Virtual) City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds” (2007) 22 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 507-532; D P Sheldon, “Claiming Ownership But Getting Owned: 
Contractual Limitations on Asserting Property Interests in Virtual Goods” (2006-2007) 54 UCLA Law 
Review 751-788; N Suzor (2012), see note 10 above, at 530; N Suzor (2010), see note 10 above, at 
1818; D L Burk, “Authorization and governance in virtual worlds” (2010) 15 First Monday; S 
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Similarly, there have been a number of suggestions in relation to the governance of 
cyberspace and the Internet more widely.55 This has included differing models for 
control at different levels and across different layers – for example, governmental 
control, environment-specific controls and social norms. Suzor indicates that in 
addressing governance in online games and virtual worlds there are weaknesses in the 
rule of law when applied to cyberspace.56 However, before these are considered, it is 
necessary to identify what is meant by governance in this particular context. Perhaps 
the most problematic element in relation to disputes in online games and virtual 
worlds arises where disputes have not been settled within the game or world, and the 
governance approach has been exhausted,57 indicating there is a chasm between the 
layers of control which operate within online games and virtual worlds, and the layers 
of control which operate outside them and include real-world laws. Governance of 
online games and virtual worlds here is essentially the control or regulation of them, 
or the methods and theories of controlling the behaviour and environments that are 
online games and virtual worlds. This is necessarily very broad, not least because 
each of these online interactive environments is distinctive and offers the user 
something slightly different. In this way, there are different elements to each, and this 
is why it becomes necessary to provide a definition of them based on shared 
characteristics.58 There is also a shared differentiating factor; the subtle distinctions in 
both environment and avatarian freedom.  
The starting point for any discussion on governance and control is the End User 
License Agreement (EULA). Although this document purports to control all aspects 
of interaction and activity within an online game or virtual world, it often falls short 
of this aim, leaving users and avatars in some significantly vulnerable positions 
should disputes arise. It has been suggested that the difficulty does not lie with the 
contract itself; rather, it lies with the enforcement of the contract.59 This is arguably a 
very pertinent point, and whilst it is a reminder of the difficulty with contracts of this 
type, there have been some strong indications that parts of these contractual 
agreements are invalid and therefore unenforceable to begin with.60 As such, the 
enforceability element is one which must be dealt with elsewhere; suffice to say that 
any system of governance is only as good as the enforcement of it.  
Aside from the EULAs, there are other suggested ideas and methods which could be 
used in order to provide some element of control in online games and virtual worlds, 
which comprise an element of cyberspace, described as a traditionally lawless place.61 
                                                                                                                                       
Humphreys, “Ruling the Virtual World. Governance in massively multiplayer online games” (2008) 11 
European Journal of Cultural Studies 149-171; S Humphreys and M de Zwart, “Griefing, Massacres, 
Discrimination and Art: the Limits of Overlapping Rule Sets in Online Games” (2012) 2 University of 
California Irvine Law Review 507-536, at 518; M de Zwart, see note 5 above, at 605; G Lastowka, see 
note 5 above.  
55 See above at Introduction.  
56 N Suzor (2010), see note 10 above, at 1842. 
57 N Suzor (2012), see note 10 above, at 594. 
58 See above at Introduction.  
59 B Glushko, see note 54 above, at 521. 
60 Bragg v Linden Research, see note 31 above. 
61 J R Reidenberg, “Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace” (1996) 45 Emory Law 
Journal 911-930. 
 
(2013) 10:3 SCRIPTed 
 
330 
If this is indeed the situation, it seems strange that regulators and providers have 
consistently sought to introduce some element of hierarchy and control. 62 
Nevertheless, other options have tended to be diverse, and focus on different aspects 
of the relationships between users and online environments.  
Online games and virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and Second Life are 
distinct spaces, and alongside sharing certain characteristics, also share a common 
theme of control: End User License Agreements.63 The contractual documents are 
diverse, encompassing Terms of Use Agreements, Terms of Service, Rules of Play, 
Codes of Conduct and License Agreements. The EULA is a standard-term agreement 
which each user is required to consent to prior to gaining full access to the online 
environment concerned. These contractual documents determine all manner of rights, 
obligations and liabilities entered into by both the end user and the game developer or 
platform provider. 64  Despite this, very few people, if any, read them or their 
contents.65 These license agreements are not between one user and all other users – 
rather, they are between one user and the developer.66 This, whilst making the 
situation workable from the perspectives of the game provider, is not beneficial to the 
users of these online environments. In this way, if there is a dispute between user A 
and user B, there is no contractual agreement between the 2 parties in disagreement. 
Therefore, users A and B must either rely upon the developer to intervene in the 
dispute – which is highly unlikely given the statements issued by providers such as 
Linden Labs67 – or base their position on third party contractual rights.68  
Aside from the elements of the online environments that are purely contractual, and 
the difficulties users may have in asserting their contractual bases for dealing with 
disagreements, the EULAs themselves often contain a wealth of clauses. These 
clauses aim to control and deal with every aspect of behaviour which may arise in the 
game environment, or link each contract to another which deals with different aspects 
of game play. For example, World of Warcraft has multiple contractual agreements, 
ranging from the EULA to the Terms of Use. The linking of one agreement to another 
was the source of a copyright dispute in the US in 2010, whereby the developers of 
World of Warcraft claimed that a user had breached the EULA and had therefore also 
breached copyright in the game.69 In this way, it is possible to construe these 
contractual agreements as forming a constitution of the environment concerned. They 
outline the central elements of the governance system, akin to the legal systems in our 
offline existences. This interpretation is possible because of positions such as those 
                                                
62 For example, dispute resolution provisions within EULAs and Non-Player Characters to patrol game 
environments.  
63 Second Life, see note 33 above; Blizzard Entertainment, “World of Warcraft End User License 
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adopted by Barlow in 1996, 70  when he declared that cyberspace is free from 
governmental control. Such an interpretation of EULA-style constitutional 
arrangements also benefits from support as diverse as that offered by Murray in his 
supposition that cyberspace is fragmented and not one-dimensional.71 As such, it 
would seem that whilst layers of control and governance are perceptible, they are also 
fragmented and no longer cohesive. If these three elements are combined, it is 
possible to conclude that each virtual world and online game is a distinct fragmented 
area of cyberspace; not subject to the traditional, jurisdictional and national 
boundaries in the offline world, but still subjected to rules and regulation albeit of a 
different kind - that which is found in the EULA, and upon which access to the 
environments is dependent.  
This interpretation broadly fits within the theory of virtual worlds, particularly 
relating to the Theory of Interration72 and the Magic Circle Theory73 – which broadly 
outline the need for a distinction between places designed for play and those that are 
not. The Interration Theory outlines a potential structured approach to regulation and 
governance: open worlds are subject to governmental control whereas closed worlds 
are not. 74  The closed-worlds, as viewed under the Interration Theory would 
essentially seal themselves off from offline law, meaning that all disputes would need 
resolving within the environment itself. This aspect of the theory poses perhaps the 
greatest challenge to the control and dominance of the EULA. If the environment is 
closed, and rejects the involvement or influence of any law or controlling mechanism 
other than that which is virtual and space-specific, the validity of the EULA is 
undermined, especially as it will inevitably contain some form of applicable law 
clause. At the very least, the Theory of Interration indicates that there ought to be 
some significant changes to the standard-form clauses contained within the license 
agreements. The Theory of Interration is closely connected to Declarations of Rights, 
and in particular the Declaration of the Rights of Avatars.75  In order for such 
regulatory systems and layers of governance to work, there would necessarily be 
some ideal of rights granted to players / users and avatars, especially if the open-
worlds are reliant upon governments to protect their rights. This is broadly aligned 
with the situations occurring in offline regulatory systems, and if open-worlds are 
willing to subject themselves to governmental regulation, it seems consistent that 
rights would be an essential element of this.  
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The Interration Theory and Rights Declarations are not however without criticisms 
and difficulties, especially as these theories can be used to highlight the potential 
pitfalls of real-world laws applying to online spaces. Nevertheless, for the discussion 
of layers of governance and control, they are a useful indicator of divisions that could 
be present. Such perspectives arise in relation to the pervasive issue of enforcement of 
online control. Tseng has advanced the Theory of Interration, and suggests that there 
are two elements requiring attention if such a system of control is to become a 
reality.76 Firstly, there would be a need to adopt the Magic Circle Theory and 
differentiate what is governed online and what is not. Then, there would be a need to 
introduce some form of legislation which would allow developers to choose from a 
number of options for their environments and would facilitate governance. This is a 
largely theoretical situation as it is highly unlikely that game developers and providers 
are willing – or able – to undergo such a significant shift in mind-set.77 Nevertheless, 
it is perhaps more possible now than ever before to see that there will be some form of 
change in approach on behalf of the developers, especially in light of the recent 
guidance issued by the Law Commission. 78  This includes calls for consumer 
protection to be extended to cover End User License Agreements,79 and this would 
necessarily encompass game contracts. This is indicative of different layers operating 
simultaneously – offline real world law is operating at one level, whilst there is 
another layer of contractual control operating within gaming environments.  
The Law Commission advice builds on previous consultations as to the state of unfair 
term legislation, and more recently, a consultation dealing with consumer protection80 
which included a refreshing yet distinct focus upon digital content. Legislative action 
is therefore not unforeseeable, and could be the first step in enacting some form of 
distinct regulatory system for online digital platforms of all varieties rather than those 
dealing primarily with content consumption. 81  However, before that stage is 
achievable, a significant number of challenges as to the regulatory frameworks and 
theories are as yet unclear in relation to online gaming and gaming environments. 
The Magic Circle theory is broadly similar to the Theory of Interration, and indicates 
that there must be a difference between what is deemed to be virtual or online, and 
that which is deemed to be ‘real’ or offline. It is suggested that this Magic Circle 
distinction is designed to allow different systems of control and governance to have 
an input. For example, in the offline, real world, governance could be through 
criminal law or a declaration of rights, whereas in an online, virtual environment, 
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77 Ibid. 
78 Law Commission, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills” (March 2013) available at 
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similar governance of behaviour is likely to be through contractual clauses. Despite 
the ease with which this position could influence governance, there are strong 
criticisms of the division between the offline and the online. It has been stated that 
such a clear-cut distinction is impossible and far from realistic.82 Similarly the 
suggestion that offline laws do not apply to online situations has been contradicted 
too.83 Despite these criticisms, the status quo does not work, and is not suited to that 
which it seeks to control. The division between online and offline layers, and laws is 
one which has pervaded the area of cyber-activity for a number of years with one 
caveat; lawmakers are beginning to realise that for laws to apply and be appropriate 
for online issues, they must be suited to the online environment rather than stretched 
to fit. Duranske has implied that it is irrelevant whether the game declares itself open 
or closed, or states that law will apply to it.84 His reasoning is based on the argument 
that such issues are trivial because ultimately, “it is just a game.”85 These criticisms 
and arguments rest on the perception of cyberspace and online games as one 
dimensional, rather than multidimensional and multi-layered, and this is the concept 
which must now be advanced. As such, it is possible to determine that theories of 
governance and control are possible in relation to online multiuser environments.  
Aside from Interration and the Magic Circle, other elements of governance and 
control are present in online interactive environments. These include initiatives such 
as social norms and community governance.86 Social norms can – and have in limited 
situations – proved valuable. There is however a significant hurdle to using social 
norms. They (social norms) are particularly fluid as concepts, especially when a 
multitude of nationalities and social groups converge as they do in online multiuser 
environments. In addition to this, there is still a need for a hierarchical structure to 
ensure that the decisions are upheld, and are not improperly enforced. This was the 
difficulty with the social-norm and community governed virtual world of 
LambdaMOO. 87  Mr Bungle raped female avatars, and in accordance with the 
community rule, punishment was issued.88 However, the community rule failed when 
the leader implemented an additional level of punishment without the knowledge or 
consent of the community. This demonstrates the vulnerability of the community self-
governance or social norm approaches in online environments. Despite this, Reed89 
and Stoup90 have recently indicated that perhaps social norms are now the appropriate 
mechanisms through which gaming ought to be controlled. This idea was discussed 
by Rowland while considering the potential developments of cybercommunities, 
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indicating that a lack of effective governance could encourage and breed disputes and 
unrest.91 This would broadly indicate that appropriate levels of governance must be in 
operation in order to ensure a cohesive community which can manage disputes is in 
existence.  
It is of course not just online games and virtual worlds that are the subject of such 
debates over governance and control. Social networking sites are very similar in that 
they require their users to subscribe to their systems of use and contractual 
agreements outlining the terms on which use is available.92  Nevertheless these 
environments do differ from gaming environments. The EULAs are broadly the same, 
containing many similar clauses. From the perspective of users, whilst the 
environments are different, the contractual agreements are not so different and this 
has proved problematic when it comes to so-called ‘market-choice.’ If a user 
distinguishes between environments but is not prepared to agree with the contractual 
terms of one vastly different space compared to all others, this user is essentially 
faced with a ‘take it or leave it’ position.93 Such an element of EULAs and licensing 
arrangements are commonplace however encounter difficulties when there is a 
distinct lack of choice. Users in this way are then forced to accept a contractual 
agreement with which they may have concerns in order to enter the environment of 
choice. This pressing consumer issue arises when games and worlds offer significant 
inducements to potential users to attract their custom.94  
The Office of Fair Trading has recently announced that it intends to explore issues 
such as this,95 and it is to be hoped that action is taken to protect consumers under 
relevant consumer protection initiatives, especially given that it is somewhat unclear 
as to whether users benefit from protection under UCTA96 and the UTCCR97 at 
present. Perhaps the recent consultations by the Office for Fair Trade will be able to 
rectify the position users are subjected to in relation to digital content, and End User 
Agreements.  
It is pertinent to consider the control issues present in online interactive, multiuser 
environments, especially when they seemingly fail to adequately prevent or resolve 
disputes arising. Contractual arrangements are not the only potential method of 
controlling online spaces; several alternatives or modified arrangements are possible. 
What is clear from the use of a community system originally in LambdaMOO, the use 
of Game Masters or Wizards,98 and the community approach adopted in Second Life99 
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is that there is a desire on the part of those who are being regulated. There is also 
some involvement in the governance system from those being regulated, albeit this 
has so far demonstrated weaknesses – and potential failings – with the layers of 
control. There is also clearly a desire and interest on the part of the game developer 
and provider to have a role in the control of the environments they create. On top of 
this, there are also clear indications that governments see a role in controlling these 
areas despite the claims of Barlow.100 As such, there is at least a triumvirate of 
interested parties, which are representative of different layers within these 
environments. Accordingly, regardless of the mechanism, when these interests are 
combined, one potential solution would be to merge the various approaches and 
interests to reflect control at different levels, and through different mechanisms 
depending on the layer. Gilbert suggests that the EULA should not be the sole 
element of governance,101 and that the logical step is to introduce a combined model 
of governance in online interactive multiuser environments, which outlines different 
layers to deal with different disputes at different levels.  
4. The Concept of Change – Re-layering the ungovernable? 
The concept of layering and layered governance needs expanding. Currently, there are 
several potential layers of control and governance in operation. Software code (under 
a ‘Code is law’102 approach), contractual control, social norms, dispute resolution 
processes and real-world laws all operate to varying extents in governing online 
games and virtual worlds. There have been a number of notorious examples from 
different online games and virtual worlds indicating the failures of various 
combinations of these controlling mechanisms. These failings have all indicated that 
while there are several possible options for resolving issues within the environments, 
there is a gulf between the real-world laws and the environmental approaches to 
disputes that arise when these options have been exhausted. This suggests that there is 
a missing layer between the two. Such a layer could potentially operate in a manner 
similar to the small-claims track for civil disputes, to ‘siphon off’ disputes which have 
not been resolved satisfactorily within the gaming environment, but which do not 
necessarily require full litigation. A greater indication from the layers currently in 
place is the ineffectiveness of some of them, particularly the code-contract-copyright 
paradigm. For example, this requires users to agree to dispute resolution 
proceedings103 under the EULA, and this is usually subjected to a particular legal 
jurisdiction; in the case of World of Warcraft, the law of California is applicable.104 In 
resolving a dispute under this contractual provision, the user is likely to be placed in a 
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position whereby the route of recourse available is prohibitive and unrealistic. This is 
indicative of a failure of the layers of governance from the perspective of a user.  
The contractual EULA relies upon copyright to provide proprietary interests, whilst 
simultaneously seeking to introduce rules and behavioural limits. The EULA is very 
much seen as a ‘one size fits all’ document. This has no layers to it – it relies on other 
mechanisms to provide the layers. When this is considered in a much wider context, 
layers become apparent. Social norms for example, provide at least two layers at a 
basic level. Above this, the EULA implements a different set of rules and 
expectations, often containing more detailed provisions. This is therefore superior to 
the social norms which govern the community directly. In this way there are now a 
number of layers. Building upon this, the code – which allows actions, property and 
controls – is the ultimate layer of what can and cannot be done and this rests above 
the EULA. This is however, far from a final layer and the remaining layers will be 
dependent upon the precise mechanisms of a particular world or game, most 
especially if the world chooses to become open or closed, and opts for governmental 
control. If this occurs, then there is the potential for a further layer to be introduced 
above the code. Whilst this is a simplistic illustration of how the layers could be 
introduced, it is not one which suffers from a lack of support. Mayer-Schonberger has 
considered layers of governance for cyberspace more widely.105 In his consideration, 
there are many more variables, but nevertheless, if each world and game is governed 
individually – as it must – then there is still potential for a further layer to be 
implemented above the EULA and above the code but below that of governmental 
involvement. This is potentially to mirror some in-house regulatory bodies such as the 
Football Association.106 This layer could be the first multi-world governance layer, 
which could regulate all worlds or games that subscribe to its authority.  
The layers of governance would reflect not only theoretical considerations, but would 
also ensure that there was appropriate regulation and adjudication on disputes at an 
appropriate level. For example, a simple case of breaching the rules of play could be 
dealt with at the social-norm level. If there was a subsequent breach, this could then 
be dealt with in a repeated manner, but there could also be the right of recourse to a 
higher level.107 Depending upon the ultimate outcome, it is possible that the dispute 
could escalate to the highest level. Even if this were the case, it would introduce some 
structured approach to these spaces, without imposing rules that are unsuited to the 
environments they seek to play a role in. Layered governance would also allow for a 
subsequent set of rules or laws to be applicable if the dispute cannot be resolved 
through the online-specific levels. At this point, the dispute would become an offline 
dispute and would fall broadly within the parameters of offline governance, thereby 
creating an incentive for disputes to be resolved virtually.  
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The different approaches and the different focuses on the relationships between users 
and online environments has been a significant factor in considering different 
controlling mechanisms. The different suggestions indicate the perspective from 
which governance is viewed and as such, it is difficult to reconcile the different 
approaches with one another. Similarly, it is inherently problematic to advocate for 
one dominant approach over all others – this has traditionally and historically been the 
situation with the EULA, yet it is proving to be far from ideal as a ‘one size fits all’ 
measure for online interactive environments. Consequently, the different governance 
approaches and suggestions must be considered in a new way. Instead of determining 
which should be the single approach to adopt, it is time to reconsider the levels of 
governance. Not all suggested approaches deal with the same issues, and for this 
reason it is impractical and undesirable to attempt to have one singular governance 
system. Similarly, it is difficult to give credence and equal significance to each 
approach as this could potentially lead to a situation where different approaches 
adjudicate on one issue but lead to different, and contradictory outcomes. This leads 
to a reconceptualization of governance, to move away from a one-dimensional 
situation. It is necessary to consider that disputes and issues arise at different levels, 
and rather than expecting a single contractual document to deal with all of these, there 
ought to be a flexible, appropriate system which can broadly be applicable to not just 
online games and virtual worlds, but cyberspace more widely. This 
reconceptualization focuses on the idea of layers, and layers of governance, through 
which multiple parties can retain their interest in control. It is to be remembered that 
online games and virtual worlds are very different environments to the offline worlds 
which we inhabit.  
In addition, there is a further element which ought to be considered in this discussion. 
This relates to the controls built-in to the code of each online game and virtual world. 
Code provides the structure and all content within the environment – without code 
there is no environment. Consequently, it would appear that code is law, as Lessig’s 
theory has advocated.108 If code is indeed law, the code provides for possible activity 
and content. If the code does not allow it or provide for it, then it cannot be. In this 
respect, the code is all-encompassing and the most powerful element of any 
governance scenario. Concurrently, those who are in control of the code ought to be 
those with the greatest and most significant interest in governance and control of the 
particular environment. In most instances the developers will be those in control of 
the code, but contradictorily will be those who have a lesser interest in control of the 
environment. The inherent conflict for developers arises in power to expel a user from 
the environment, but this user is likely to be a paying consumer, and there is little 
incentive to punish such a user, regardless of the breaches of EULA or Rules of Play 
that the user has undertaken. By punishing or expelling a user, the developer is 
reducing the income stream and profitability. Whilst this punishment, control and 
expelling users may be within the power of the developer, it is unlikely to be desirable 
or realistic for the developer to be placed in a position of conflicting interests.  
Consequently, Lessig’s theory that code is law109 needs some expansion and slight 
modification if it is to become the centre-piece of reconceptualised layers of 
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governance. However, it is not just code that is currently centrally placed in the 
current system of control. Code is protected by copyright, and copyright is allocated 
by contracts.110 As such, there is an inter-dependent core which sees code, copyright 
and contract allocating not just property rights and intellectual property rights but 
adjudicating on disputes. In this relationship, different levels combine to produce a 
situation whereby contract is dominant.  
5. Conclusion  
This article has considered the current governance framework for online games and 
virtual worlds and some of the theoretical arguments for altering the system. The 
dominant conclusion and hypothesis rests with the idea of layers. Such a concept will 
allow online worlds and games to retain their distinctive features and their 
independence from other environments, whilst introducing some structure, and non-
contractual control of these valuable spaces. Lessig has indicated that code is law111 
and whilst code can be law, it relies upon other things to ensure that it is. Code alone 
is not sufficient to deal with all manner of disputes. Similarly, contract has the same 
weakness.  
Subsequently, in light of the SABIP report112 indicating copyright and contract must 
be reconsidered, and the Law Commission advice that consumer protections need to 
apply to EULAs,113 there is a compelling case for pre-emptive changes to be made to 
online gaming governance systems. Layers of control are required to govern complex, 
advanced online interactive environments at appropriate levels, and dispel the myth 
that cyberspace is lawless. Cyberspace is not lawless – cyberspace is distinct, and 
often misunderstood. Reconceptualising cyberspace – but more particularly online 
games and virtual worlds – would allow a reconsidered and restructured governance 
system, and reflect the acceptance of cyberspace as a distinct and diverse space.  
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